FOR FREEDOM AND PERFECTION. The Life of Yané Sandansky
Mercia MacDermott

23. WAR AND CATASTROPHE

As the months and the years went by, it became increasingly clear that those who sincerely supported the Hürriyet were fighting a losing battle. The Bulgarian Court and bourgeoisie had long favoured war as the solution to the Macedonian problem; their opposite numbers in Greece and Serbia were not averse to the idea, while the Young Turks, with their shortsighted nationalism, were alienating the sympathies of the national minorities and playing straight into the hands of the war-mongers. No small role in the general deterioration of the situation was played by irresponsible provocation on the part of the Right Wing of the Organization.

While Yané had experienced little difficulty in making the transition from an outlaw chieftain to a peaceful politician and diocesan councillor, there were others who proved less amenable to change. The Hürriyet had created a large body of redundant professional chetnitsi, unaccustomed to working for a living, and incapable of adapting to the new conditions. This was especially true of chetnitsi from areas dominated by the Right Wing, who were accustomed to being maintained at the expense of the Organization, both on Turkish territory and in the Bulgarian Kingdom. Yané had never allowed his men to remain idle, and those who had to spend any length of time in the Kingdom were set to work, not only for reasons of economy, but also to protect them from the demoralization that comes from aimlessly hanging around cafés and taverns. Even after the proclamation of the Constitution, cheti organized in the Kingdom continued to cross into Macedonia to disturb the fragile peace established by the Hürriyet. The activities of these cheti increased the Turks’ mistrust of the Bulgarian population, and, in the autumn of 1909, they retaliated by drafting a draconian Law Against cheti, which in its original form would have allowed the authorities to take action against the families of chetnitsi and ‘suspicious persons’, as well as the actual offenders, and to imprison those who circulated poems and song-books of an inflammatory nature. The Law was finally presented to the Ottoman Parliament in March 1910, in a somewhat watered-down version: the families of chetnitsi were no longer liable to prosecution, but anyone who failed to arrest or betray chetnitsi was himself, ipso facto, regarded as a participant in the cheti. Thus, in the areas where cheti operated, the peasants found themselves between the Devil and the deep blue sea,

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since, if they betrayed the cheti, the Organization would punish them, and if they did not, the Turkish authorities would. The Left took the view that the time for cheti had passed, and that their continued activity was harmful and unjustified. Narodna Volya laid the blame squarely on Austria, whose plans to reach the Aegean could be furthered by anarchy in Turkey, and on Ferdinand, ‘the little Tsar with the morbid ambitions’, [1] whose foreign and domestic policy also required that the Macedonian question be kept constantly on the boil. While agreeing that, in the interests of public order, a law against cheti was necessary, the paper considered that the proposed law was a bad one, which would evoke general discontent and which could have the opposite effect to that intended. It suggested that good government and a multi-national militia would be the best antidotes. [2] This, however, required mutual confidence of a kind that was sadly lacking. The Turks both feared and distrusted the Bulgarian population of Macedonia; official Bulgarian policy did nothing to allay their suspicions, and thus both Turks and Bulgarians found themselves trapped in a vicious spiral of ever increasing repression and ill-will.

During 1910, the Turkish Government began a campaign to disarm the Bulgarian population in Western Macedonia, i.e. where the influence of the Right Wing was strongest. In some places this led to people being arrested and beaten up. In the Melnik area, on the other hand, the authorities appeared either unable or unwilling to protect the Bulgarian population from robbery and murder at the hands of Turkish and Albanian armed bands, and Yané organized a protest petition, signed by the mayors of thirty-four villages, describing in detail 22 cases which had occurred in the past few months, and complaining that, whereas they had fulfilled their duties as citizens, the Government had failed to do what was expected of it. The petition, dated August 16/29 1910, was translated into Turkish by Dalchev and was presented to the Grand Vizir. A French translation was also released to the foreign press. The petition immediately provoked an article critical of Yané’s action in the Salonika newspaper Yeni Asir, and a second article in the Constantinople paper Tanin, which tried to make light of the crimes, attributing some of the murders to jealous husbands, and alleging that, since the crime-rate in Melnik was far below that in Anatolia, there was no cause for complaint! [3] For its part, the Turkish Government ordered the Vali of Salonika—Ibrahim-Bey—to investigate the allegations contained in the petition and to prevail upon Yané to surrender the arms of the Serres Region. This Yané had not the slightest intention of doing. Indeed, he was currently engaged in superintending the concealment of the Region’s guns in secret stores all over Pirin. When the authorities in Melnik summoned him to the post

1. Narodna Volya, 26.IX.1909.

2. Ibid., 3.IX.1909 and 6.III.1910.

3. TDIA, f. 176, op. 2, a.e.766, pp. 1-6. Reports from the Bulgarian consulates in Salonika and Constantinople to Paprikov.

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office to communicate with the Vali, who wanted him to go to Salonika, Yané took the precaution of sending people to bring the militia from the villages around Melnik to surround the town and to be ready to free him, should the Turks be planning a repetition of the previous post-office incident. When the militia was in position, Yané boldly told the Vali that if he wished to discuss anything with him, he must come to Melnik. The Turks stood in awe of Yané and handled him with kid gloves, even when they considered him obstreperous. Thus the Vali meekly agreed to travel to Melnik, whereupon Yané left the town, and, when Ibrahim-Bey arrived there some two days later, Yané sent word that the Vali and his suite, which included several Young Turks and the correspondent of the French newspaper Le Temps, should come to Lopovo, high in Pirin. After some negotiations, it was agreed that they should meet in the more accessible village of Rozhen. [4] There, under the watchful eye of the Organization’s militia and former chetnitsi, who ringed the village, the Vali of Salonika and Yané discussed outstanding problems at length. Yané had previously informed the Melnik authorities that, if any attempt was made to disarm the population, he would return to the mountains with his cheti, and now he openly told the Vali that he would not surrender so much as the sling of a single gun. Yet, while remaining adamant on the question of weapons, Yané conducted the negotiations with such tact and persuasion that it was the Vali who made all the concessions. He agreed that the Serres Region should be neither disarmed nor settled with Turkish refugees; that the area be cleared of Turkish and Albanian bands; that more Bulgarians be appointed to posts in local government; that more Bulgarian children be accepted into Turkish secondary and higher schools; that Bulgarians, as well as Turks, be given loans from the Agrarian Bank and that the problems of the chiflik peasants be dealt with.

Thus the negotiations ended amicably and apparently in victory for Yané, but the latter was too experienced a politician to imagine that his victory was anything other than temporary. The Turks had ever been more generous in their promises than in their deeds, and even the Vali’s promises applied only to part of Macedonia. Elsewhere, the situation was going from bad to worse, with the arrest and ill-treatment of those who resisted disarmament, with the forcible eviction of Bulgarians to make room for Turkish refugees, and with every sign that the Turks were determined to maintain their privileged position. The ‘shadows of the ancient prison house’ were, indeed, beginning to close once more, and the ‘dazzling light of liberty’ had all but failed.

In this situation, it was only to be expected that an increasing number of Bulgarian voices should be raised in favour of a ‘war of liberation’ as the only possible solution. During the first half of 1910, a number of former members of the Organization, from areas where the Organization

4. TDIA, f. 1508, op. 2, a.e. 25, pp. 52-54.

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had been dissolved following the Hürriyet, had met to discuss what should be done, and had decided to revive the Organization and to renew revolutionary armed struggle. As a result, a new Central Committee, consisting of Todor Alexandrov, Petŭr Chaulev and Hristo Chernopeev, [5] was formed ‘by written agreement’ early in 1911. Through Chernopeev— who, after despairing of the Hürriyet, had gone to Sofia [6]—efforts appear to have been made to persuade Yané to join the new group, as shown by a letter written by Chernopeev to Yané on October 2, 1910, i.e. about five weeks after the meeting between Yané and the Vali of Salonika. In this letter, Chernopeev refers to various occasions when Yané is said to have indicated that he was thinking of going ‘underground’, and then continues: ‘A month ago, you had run away, but after your meeting with the Vali you became "legal". How is all this to be explained? There are two suppositions: either you are playing at being a komita in order to bamboozle the Melnik population into supporting you without your accounting for the sums which you spend, or else you are an agent provocateur. Accusations which, as you see, are very cruel, but I can find no other supposition, though you, if you like, can repudiate them.’ Chernopeev concludes his letter by asking Yané a number of questions connected with his present attitude towards resuming clandestine activity, and says that, if he receives no answer, he will conclude that his suppositions are correct, and will act accordingly.

Yané obviously realized that this letter was not, in fact, a personal message from his old comrade, and, treating it with the contempt that it deserved, he chose to ignore it. [7] The true character of the letter became plain when the ‘Head Committee of the Bulgarian People’s Macedonian-Adrianople Revolutionary Organization’ published the text in the Sofia newspaper Dnevnik, [8] as part of a circular, addressed to the members of the said Committee and the ‘population of the Serres Revolutionary Region’, and aimed at undermining Yané’s prestige and influence in that Region.

5. See Dimitŭr Gotsev, Nationalnoosvoboditelna borba v Makedonia 1912-1915, p. 15. The new External Representatives were Todor Lazarov and Pavel Hristov, while Dr Tatarchev, Dr Kushev and Yavorov were elected as reserve members of the Central Committee.

6. News items connected with Chernopeev’s arrival in Bulgaria were printed in Kambana, 25 & 26.I.1910.

7. There is, in fact, no evidence that Yané ‘ran away’, i.e. went underground, and then went back on his decision, unless his absence from Melnik while collecting the signatures of the 34 mayors was misinterpreted. That secrecy had to be observed until the document was ready is clear from a report from the Salonika consulate to Paprikov, which describes how Dalchev had informed the consulate in secret and had asked that nothing be said until the signatures had been collected. This would be done by Yané himself, who was staying in ‘mountain hamlets not far from Melnik and was considered to be semi-illegal’. See TDIA, f. 176, op. 2, a.e. 766, p. 1. Report dated 28.VI1.1910.

8. Dnevnik, 13.I.1911.

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The circular begins with a commentary on the political situation, and argues that, in view of the fraudulent character of the Hürriyet, the only way open to true revolutionaries is that of underground struggle—anything less represents betrayal and is tantamount to support for Turkish panislamic aspirations. The writers then express their desire to ‘draw the attention of the Serchani to the two-faced behaviour of certain former leading revolutionaries, because this duplicity could have a disastrous effect on the struggle for true freedom’. Chernopeev’s letter follows, and Yané’s failure to answer it is interpreted as proof of the accusations contained in it. The Head Committee then adds a number of additional accusations, the purpose of which is to ‘warn’ the population of the Serres Region that ‘Yané Sandansky has completely surrendered himself to the service of the Turkish Government and is an enemy of the revolutionary struggle’. Yané is accused of a whole series of questionable deeds and is generally made out to be a man ready to do anything for money. He is, for example, said to have deposited 70,000 leva of the Organization’s funds in Dupnitsa for his personal use. (In fact, he never touched a penny of this money, and it was still intact at the time of his death.) He is also said to support the Turkish policy of disarming the Bulgarian population, when, in fact, his was the only region which never, at any point, gave up its arms.

The Head Committee’s offensive had as little effect on the population of the Serres Region as Chernopeev’s letter had on Yané. It was not until the mid-1920s, after all the leading Serchani had been murdered, that the Right Wing of the Organization was able to establish itself in Pirin, and, even then, the victory was a hollow, impermanent one, for the hearts of the people remained true to Yané, and, in new struggles, under new circumstances, it was precisely those whom he had led and educated, and their children, who formed the new generation of fighters for freedom and social justice.

Thus Serres remained unrepentantly Left, but, during the painful and complicated months which led up to the Balkan War, it became clear that Chernopeev—ever volatile in his enthusiasms, and now impetuous in his rejection of Turkish half-measures and deceptions—had fallen under the influence of elements whose tactics had more in common with those advocated by Ilinden and the Right-Wing Kyustendil Congress than the time-honoured policies of the Serchani and their Strumitsa allies. Under its new leaders, the Organization undertook a series of spectacular acts of terrorism known as the ‘donkey outrages’—an earlier version of the car bomb. Infernal machines were concealed in bags of flour, grain, etc., loaded onto donkeys, which were left on the market squares of Shtip, Kochani, Doiran and other towns, at peak trading hours, so that large numbers of innocent people were killed and maimed. Still more innocent people suffered when the infuriated Turkish authorities retaliated by indiscriminate massacres of the Bulgarian population. The only purpose

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which the ‘donkey outrages’ served was to inflame public opinion on both sides, and to hasten the outbreak of war.

The Serchani were totally opposed to such actions. They still regarded war as the greater evil, and one which, moreover, would not produce the results intended by its advocates. Yet, however much they deplored the policies of the Bulgarian Government and the new Organization, the Serchani could not afford to ignore them and risk being overtaken by events for which they were unprepared, for, in the final analysis, if it really came to war between Bulgaria and Turkey, they, as Bulgarians, would throw all their weight into helping the Bulgarian Army. Thus, in 1911, Yané began to seek clarification on the intentions of the Bulgarian Government and on the role which the Serchani could play in the event of war. In January 1911, he had two meetings with Mustakov, the secretary of the Bulgarian Consulate in Salonika, who sent a report of their conversation to the Chief of General Staff in Sofia. [9] The meetings were arranged through Dr Tenchev, in whose house the first meeting was held. According to Mustakov, Yané asserted that, in spite of believing in the possibility of Turkey’s regeneration, he was still a pure Bulgarian at heart, and he spoke bitterly of those who ‘accused him of lack of patriotism, of hostility towards Bulgaria, etc., when he had done nothing for Turkey which had harmed his own people, when he had protected them against what they had suffered in other regions, when he had preserved his arms (and even increased them) and was always ready, when necessary, to win something through revolution. He alone was ready to help Bulgaria in a war (in spite of the fact that people considered him to be her enemy), firstly because his organization was as intact as ever, and, secondly, because his area was the most important for Bulgaria in the event of a war’. Later, Mustakov had a second talk with Yané in the latter’s lodgings, as a result of which the diplomat appears to have become convinced both of Yané’s sincere desire to make himself useful and of the strategic importance of the Serres Region, and he asked the C.G.S. for instructions as to how to proceed.

In March 1911, Yané sent a message via Naumov to Malinov, who then held the posts of both Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. The message, which was forwarded by the Salonika Consulate, read as follows: ‘I hear that a number of persons from Bulgaria have recently entered the Series sanjak. These people are the tools of the Sofia United Revolutionary Macedonian-Adrianople Committee and aim to win my region through clandestine actions and through sowing discord among my people. I declare that, if it is a question of organizing and preparing my region for some action or other, it is already sufficiently prepared and equipped with people and with means. I am ready at a moment’s notice to go into

9. Military Archives in Veliko Tŭrnovo. f. 23, op. II, a.e. 163, pp. 1-5. Report dated 21.I.1911.

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the mountains and to give sufficient proof of the preparedness of my people to undertake resolute actions. If, on the other hand, the Sofia revolutionary circles—inspired and incited, not by the Government of Mr Malinov, but by the people of the Sofia War Ministry, including first and foremost a certain Captain Kostov or Kosta Nikolov, and by those of the Court—aim merely to annoy me, then I shall be obliged to go to undesirable extremes, and will not be responsible for the dismal consequences. I consider that I can still work legally for a certain time. My comrades will also do the same as long as they are able. But, if the time has come for me to cease my legal activity, then tell me so, instead of sending people into the Serres Region to work against me, thereby provoking me to go to undesirable extremes.’ [10]

Although Yané took the precaution of ordering a grey Caucasian burka (a thick felt cloak) to protect himself from the cold and damp, should he once again be forced to become an outlaw, [11] he continued to work legally in every direction that was open to him, and, indeed, much of his most fruitful work as a diocesan councillor was done precisely during this period when the shadows of war were beginning to gather. He also did his best to reason with the Young Turk leaders in order to persuade them that, for their own good, they should adopt more progressive policies. He went, for example, to Salonika and argued with one of the Union and Progress leaders that, by bringing in draconian laws, the Turkish State was more likely to destroy than save itself. When the Turk took offence, Yané bluntly told him that the Bulgarians would be forced to take up arms in order to put an end to an intolerable situation. The Turk retorted that their guns would be little use against Turkish artillery, whereupon Yané pointed out that Turkish artillery had not prevented the loss of Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria, and that, if the Young Turks continued their present course, they would lose Macedonia and Thrace as well. ‘If you really love this land,’ Yané told him, ‘give freedom to the people who inhabit it, and thus, in this way, it will be preserved from decay, and you yourself will the better fulfill your duty as a son of this country.’ [12]

Yané still enjoyed the respect and goodwill of the Vali, and when his old friend, Captain Angelov, was arrested after creating a scene in a café chantant, Yané persuaded the Vali to release him. [13] His relations with the Young Turks in the Serres Region were, however, becoming less happy, for many of them were land-owning beys who objected to his constant agitation for agrarian reform. A few of the Serres Young Turks, on the

10. TDIA, f. 176, op. 2, a.e. 1068, pp. 1-2. Report dated 7.III.1911.

11. See letter from Yané to Tasko Stoilyov (Kocherinovo) dated 13.XII.1910. OIM Blagoevgrad, No. 238.

12. Arnaudov. Unpublished Opus cit., p. 25.

13. Military Archives, Veliko Tŭrnovo. f. 23, op.II, a.e. 163, pp. 4-5. Report from Mustakov to C.G.S., Sofia, dated 7.I.1911.

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other hand, sided with Yané, because they, too, realized that only a radical programme of reforms, such as that proposed by the P.F.P., could save the Ottoman Empire. A certain Dr Ahmet Bey even suffered for his support for the P.F.P. He was summoned to Serres, shut up in the barracks and threatened by the beys before being allowed to return home. After this, he was more circumspect, but he still sided with the Serchani. [14]

As the international situation grew more tense, fresh attempts were made at disarming the population in the Serres Region, but once again Yané’s categorical opposition and persuasive arguments forced the Turks to desist and to make other concessions as well. The disarmament action was renewed after the ‘donkey outrages’, and plans were laid to ambush Yané and Buynov. These, however, were thwarted, thanks to warnings from Dr Ahmet and other friendly Turks. [15] Another attempt on the part of reactionary Turks to kill Yané was made when he was a guest at a Turkish party in the so-called Pashova house in Melnik. Thanks to his sang-froid and resourcefulness, Yané escaped unscathed by walking out arm-in-arm with the most important Turks present, so that the assassins could not shoot at him without hitting his companions. [16]

It was not only conservative Turks who threatened Yané’s life. His enemies within the Organization continued their attempts to kill him. In a letter written to Buynov on November 16, 1911, Yané speaks of an abortive attempt on the part of Chavdara to ambush him near Moshtanets, when he was visiting the Gorna Dzhumaya area, of an earlier, abandoned plan to throw bombs at him in a café, and of a proposed ‘expedition against us’. [17]

Yané’s constant study of the wider political situation was also reflected in his correspondence. In a letter dated November 19, 1911, he wrote: ‘Recently, it seems that the outlook is for the political atmosphere to thicken badly; on the one hand, the successes of the Chinese revolutionaries have given European diplomacy a great fright; the current confused situation in Persia, and Russia’s involvement in it, the Turco-Italian War—all this appears to suggest that Austrian diplomacy could hardly find a better moment than the present for an aggressive policy here in the Balkans. And, indeed, it is not sleeping. So far, some 300,000 Austrian soldiers are massed on the Bosnian frontier, so that, as you see, all this goes to show us that important political events are fast developing on the political horizon. Whether we will be able to interpret them aright and take up the necessary position in time—this we will leave the future to

14. Arnaudov, Opus cit., p. 25.

15. Ibid., pp. 25-26.

16. Accounts of this incident can be found in Pirinsko Delo, 14 & 17.I.1967, and TDIA, f. 1508, op. 2, a.e. 25, pp. 49-50. There is considerable variation in detail, but the basic facts tally in all accounts.

17. TDIA, f. 1508, op. 1, a.e. 927. This letter was published by Tsocho Bilyarsky and Iliya Paskov in Literaturen Front, 7.VIII.1980.

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answer. Write to me from there how the situation is seen there by the various factors.’ [18]

To the last possible moment, the Serchani attempted to work constitutionally through the Turkish Parliament, and when, during the spring of 1912, chronic unrest in Albania caused the resignation of the Turkish Government and the calling of new elections, Yané himself personally campaigned on behalf of Buynov and Stoyu Hadzhiev, who were both elected to the Turkish Parliament, together with four other Bulgarians. That Yané himself did not stand was probably due to his desire constantly to be on the spot in his region, in order to be able to respond to every new development as the crisis deepened.

Yané’s practical achievements during the period of constitutional government in Turkey, and especially during the latter years of disillusion and despair, show how much can be wrung from even the stoniest ground with effort and the right approach.

*  *  *

From 1910 onwards, the Bulgarian advocates of war with the Turks had been making their final preparations. As a first step, Ferdinand urged the Government of Malinov to prepare amendments to the Constitution which would give him the right, without reference to the National Assembly, to enter into alliances with other countries. Bulgaria’s relative weakness (4.5 million inhabitants, as opposed to Turkey’s 25 million, and a potential army of 300,000 against the Turks’ 500,000 in south-east Europe) necessitated the formation of an anti-Turkish alliance which would include Greece and Serbia, and at the same time it was considered politic to secure the support of one or other of the Great Powers. Although in the period immediately after the Hürriyet, Austria, who regarded Serbia as a deadly enemy, had been favourably disposed towards Bulgaria, her foreign policy soon came into line with that of Germany, whose plans for expansion into Asia Minor required a sound Turkey under German influence. In the event, Russia appeared to be the most suitable power, and, at the beginning of 1910, Ferdinand, accompanied by Malinov and Paprikov, visited St Petersburg, but no concrete agreement was reached, since the Russians were not over-keen on an actual war in the Balkans, or on letting Bulgaria have Salonika and Adrianople, as Ferdinand demanded.

At the same time, negotiations were conducted at legation level between Serbia and Bulgaria, but, after some time, the talks foundered, owing to Serbia’s growing insistence on having an outlet to the Aegean and the unwillingness of Malinov’s Government to cede any part of Macedonia. Ferdinand then decided that he required a Government which

18. Letter to a friend referred to by the pseudonym Dopisniché. Yané always signed his letters to this friend with the pseudonym Chovekŭt (The Man). The letter is in OIM Blagoevgrad, No. 1048.

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was manifestly pro-Russian and which would be prepared to compromise on territorial arrangements with Serbia. He therefore forced Malinov to resign, and, on March 16, 1911, he replaced him with Ivan Geshov, leader of the Narodna Party, who formed a coalition with the Progressive Liberals of Dr Danev.

At the beginning of July 1911, a specially convened Grand National Assembly amended the Constitution, despite opposition from all the lefter and more progressive parties, including the Agrarians, Narrow Socialists, Radicals and Broad Socialists. Thus Ferdinand was given a free hand to play fast and loose with the fate of millions of human beings. Russian diplomacy now began to take a more positive attitude towards the idea of a Balkan alliance, mainly because Austria was once again wooing Bulgaria with honours for Ferdinand and economic carrots for the bourgeoisie. [19]

Negotiations between Bulgaria and Serbia were renewed under the aegis of Russia, who now saw an alliance between the two small Slav states as the best barrier to the German Drang nach Osten. This time, the two states were eager to exploit the difficulties in which Turkey found herself as a result of the war with Italy in North Africa, and, on March 13, 1912, they signed a Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, which at first glance appeared to be mainly a defensive arrangement in case of attack by Austria or Turkey. In fact, the main purpose of the Treaty—and especially the secret clauses attached to it—was to arrange for the division of the territory gained in a future victorious war against Turkey. In their haste and greed for conquest, Ferdinand and his Government abandoned one of the nation’s most sacred articles of faith, namely, that Macedonia was an integral part of Bulgaria, and that, if it could not be reunited with the rest of the country, then it should become autonomous, but remain whole. According to the provisions of the secret clauses, the territory north and north-west of the mountain known as the Shar Planina was recognized as being indisputably Serbian, while all the territory to the east of the Rhodope and the lower reaches of the Struma was recognized as Bulgarian. If Macedonia did not become autonomous (and the signatories did not appear convinced of this possibility, since they devoted much attention to the details of its future partition), then it should be divided between Bulgaria and Serbia in the following manner: the territory south of a line running between Kriva Palanka and Ohrid was to be given to Bulgaria, while the territory between this line and the Shar Planina, including such towns as Kumanovo, Tetovo, Debŭr, Kichevo and Kochani, was designated as ‘contested zone’, the future ownership of which was to be decided after the war, with the Tsar of Russia acting as arbitrator.

In May 1912, again under the aegis of Russia, Bulgaria and Greece signed a treaty for a ‘defensive alliance’, which contained no territorial

19. The Emperor Franz Joseph finally decorated Ferdinand with the Order of the Golden Fleece, Austria’s highest honour, which he had long coveted. Austria also made Bulgaria a loan and other economic concessions.

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arrangements, and, in August 1912, Montenegro joined the Balkan Alliance. This Balkan Alliance was, however, not the defensive union that it claimed to be; it was an aggressive union, in which each partner secretly aimed to grab as much as possible for himself.

It was easy for the Bulgarian politicians to whip up public enthusiasm for a war against Turkey. Few were the Bulgarian hearts which did not bleed for Macedonia; few were the men of military age who would not gladly had died for Macedonia; few, indeed, were the Bulgarian families who had no blood link with Macedonia, for every town in the kingdom numbered among its citizens refugees or descendents of refugees from Macedonia. The massacres of Bulgarians by Turks which followed the bomb outrages in Shtip (November 1911), Kochani (July 1912) and Doiran (August 1912) evoked universal public indignation, and soon it was the nation which seemed to be leading the Government to war, and not vice versa. People flocked in their thousands to mass meetings at which resolutions were passed urging speedy action to deliver their brothers from bondage, and patriotic sentiments of the noblest kind swept all other considerations aside.

Few were prepared to listen to the discordant voice of warning raised by the Narrow Socialists, who, like Cassandra, were fated to prophesy truly and be disbelieved. This Party could not be accused of lack of sympathy for the ‘brothers beyond Rila’, for its leadership, like every other group of Bulgarians, contained its fair share of men from Macedonia, including Dimitŭr Blagoev himself, whose native village had suffered pillage, murder and arson at the hands of Turks and Greeks andartes, and Georgi Dimitrov, whose parents had fled from Razlog, after the suppression of the 1878 uprising. Yet, while condemning Turkish tyranny in the harshest possible terms, the Narrow Socialists had always seen the Macedonian problem as part of a wider problem, soluble only in terms of the struggle of the working people of all nationalities against exploitation, both feudal and capitalist. Year in and year out, the Narrow Socialists had consistently campaigned for peace, international understanding and a Balkan federative republic, and now during the long hot summer of 1912, when nationalist euphoria was reaching explosion point, they continued to speak with the still small voice of calm, warning the nation that it was being deluded and misled by the monarchy and the bourgeoisie, and that war would not and could not achieve the desired result, but would merely result in national catastrophe. But theirs was a voice crying in the wilderness, and thus, when the reservists were finally called to the colours, they came joyfully, singing songs and carrying flowers, and all over Bulgaria men who had fled from Macedonia formed volunteer detachments and cheti to help the Army in its war of liberation. None of them, of course, knew of the secret clauses to the treaty with Serbia.

In all the states of the Balkan Alliance, mobilization was ordered on September 17-18 (September 30-October 1, new style), 1912. On

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September 26/October 9, Montenegro declared war on Turkey and attacked the fortress of Shkodra. On September 30/October 13, the Balkan Alliance sent a note to the Turkish Government demanding the latter’s consent to the autonomy of the European vilayets, and, in reply, Turkey declared war on the Alliance on October 4/17. On the following day, October 5/18 1912, the Alliance declared war on Turkey.

From the Bulgarian point of view, it was indeed a just war, since it was fought to liberate Bulgarians from foreign bondage, but from the very beginning, it was conducted in a manner which seriously jeopardized the Bulgarian cause. Before a single shot had been fired, the Bulgarian Government had, in effect, partially nullified the whole purpose of the war by conceding that Macedonia could be partitioned and that some areas inhabited mainly by Bulgarians could be given to Serbia. Once the fighting had started, the Bulgarian Army put its main effort into a drive on Constantinople, while the liberation of Macedonia was left to the Serbian and Greek Armies. This division of labour may have been acceptable to Ferdinand for whom Byzantium meant more than Macedonia, but a more glaring example of wolves being invited into a sheep-fold could scarcely be imagined. For decades the Bulgarian population in Macedonia had been plagued by Greek and Serbian priests and teachers, and latterly this ‘peaceful’ propaganda had been reinforced by the activity of armed cheti, which, in Western Macedonia, especially, had engaged the attention of the Organization to the virtual exclusion of all other activity. At the Rila Congress in 1905, Boris Sarafov had narrowly escaped a death sentence for his part in assisting a few Serbian cheti to enter Macedonia, but his indiscretion pales into insignificance beside that committed by the Bulgarian Government when it formally agreed that Greek and Serbian armies should occupy almost all Macedonia. It is true that the Treaty with Serbia provided for a ‘condominium’ over liberated territory until a final settlement was reached, but possession is nine-tenths of the Law, and the arrangement was fraught with risks that should have been apparent to anyone with an ounce of political acumen.

On the eve of the Balkan War, during the summer of 1912, the Serchani gathered in Salonika to discuss the situation. Buynov came specially from Constantinople, and Taskata and Panitsa were also present. Chudomir was, however, missing, because he was finishing his education in Switzerland. At the same time, there appear to have been in Salonika emissaries from Bulgaria, who informed the Serchani of the imminence of war and were anxious to know what line they would adopt. When the Serchani voted unanimously to participate actively on the side of Bulgaria, these emissaries gave them assurances that those involved in the murder of Garvanov and Sarafov would receive a free pardon. This question was

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now of vital concern to the Serchani, whose leaders were still technically outlaws in the eyes of the Bulgarian State, and, as such, were liable to be arrested or shot on sight. Various contemporary sources bear witness to Yané’s anxiety to regularize his status in view of the new situation, and to become a normal Bulgarian citizen once more. [20] Yet, in spite of repeated assurances that everything was in hand, the Government continued to keep Yané on tenterhooks for more than two years.

A few days before the mobilization, the Serchani met again, this time in Melnik, and decided that the time had come for them to go underground and to make final preparations for armed struggle, each in the area allotted to him. Yané himself remained a little longer in Melnik, and then, a few days before war was declared, he, too, quietly slipped away into Pirin, where he had already prepared huts to shelter refugees from the plains and supplies of food to feed them. After the actual outbreak of war, Yané called a further meeting of his people from the Serres and Drama Districts. They conferred for a day and a night near Lopovo; and confirmed their decision to participate in the War, since, from the wording of the